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Merit Selection of Federal Judges
By GLENN R. WINTERs*
INTRODUCTION
Without law the democracy we all cherish would quickly
degenerate to anarchy. The tremendous importance of law to
the American people follows as a matter of course from this
precept. Indeed, the much espoused theme that ours is a gov-
ernment of laws and not of men' is rooted in a deep respect for,
and faith in, the rule of law. From this country's birth that trust
has been embodied in the Constitution. It is the cornerstone and
foundation of our legal structure. Even so, it and the laws enacted
by Congress have no life or force separate from the people we
choose to administer them.'
Because the continuing significance of our legal structure
relies so heavily on its administrators, the quality of justice is
directly related to the quality of those who are given the power
to dispense it. Thus, the retention of the confidence and esteem
of all who are subject to the laws of this country depends largely
on the competence and character of our judges.3 For this reason,
the question of who is to assume the judicial role is one of vital
concern to each citizen. Logically, the foremost means of assuring
a sound, efficient and respected legal system is by protecting the
integrity and responsibility of the method by which judges are
selected. This paper will inspect the present selection process at
the federal level.4 In so doing, the basic concern will be an
G lenn R. Winters is executive director of the American Judicature Society
and editor of JuDIc kruE, the Journal of the American Judicature Society. This
article was prepared with the assistance of Richard P. Matthews, a research as-
sistant in the Society and a student in the University of Chicago Law School.
I See The King v. Shipley, 4 Dougl. 78, 170, 99 Eng. Rep. 774, 824 (K.B.
1784) (opinion by L. Mansfield); Learned Hand in IvING, THE Spnrr oF LmEaTy
287 (3d ed. 1960).
2 In this context "administer" means the interpretation as well as execution of
the laws. Specifically the term thus applies only to federal judges and magistrates.
3 The words of Chief Justice Vanderbilt support this conclusion: "The basic
consideration in every judicial establishment is the caliber of its personnel. The law
as administered cannot be better than the judge who expounds it ... " A. VANDER-
BILT, THE CHALLENGE OF LAW REFoR 11 (1955).
4 For an examination of judicial selection procedures of the state and local
(Continued on next page)
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evaluation of the merits of the present system. A comparison
with the selection process at the state level and with past
proposals for change will be made with a view to a remodeling
of the current highly political process. Finally it will be sug-
gested that a non-partisan judicial nominating commission work-
ing within the scope of the Senate's advisory powers under
Article II would do much to insure the quality of the federal
bench while also effecting greater impartiality and public confi-
dence. It will not attempt to be exhaustive or specific. Rather,
this paper is intended as food for thought with the hope that it
will prove to be a catalyst to further thought and ultimately action
by Congress.
THE CURRENT PRocEss
The present system of selecting federal judges is, on the sur-
face, a very simple appointive scheme: the President appoints
all judges with the "advice and consent" of the Senate.5 The
rationale, other than tradition, for granting such extensive ap-
pointive powers to the President with a reservation of the power
to "check" given to the Senate is in theory very strong. It is
based on the fact that the President is the only nationally
elected officer; as such, he can lay claim to be representative of
the nation's beliefs, desires and world view. In practice the
system is far from the careful search for qualified candidates
anticipated by the early founders.6
The greatest criticism of the present appointive system is its
highly political overtones. From the time of President Cleveland
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
levels see AmERUCAN JTDICATURE SociETY, JUDIcAL SELECTION AND TENURE (Rep.
No. 7, 1971). There has been extensive discussion over the merits and demerits of
judicial selection at the state-local level for some time. The American Judicature
Society's report includes an extensive bibliography of that discussion. In compari-
son, very little has been written about the federal selection procedure and merit
selection. For general examination, however, see Chase, Federal Judges: The Ap-
pointing Process, 51 MINN. L. REv. 185 (1966); Leflar, The Quality of Judges, 35
IND. L. J. 289 (1960).
G "He [the President] shall have Power.... by and with the advice and con-
sent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls,
Judges of the Supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose
Appointments are not therein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established
by law .... U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
6 See Tim FEDEALIsT No. 76 AND 77, at 494-98 (A. Hamilton ed. 1937)
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CoNVENTioN OF 1787 (M. Farrand ed. 1911).
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to the present administration, over 90 percent of those appointed
have been from the party of the President.7 This does not neces-
sarily mean the appointments are bad, but it does undermine
impartiality, ruin the apolitical atmosphere expected of the bench,
and cause otherwise well-qualified prospects to be passed over
solely because of their political affiliation.8
It is a fundamental premise of our system of government that
the judiciary functions best when it is non-partisan and unat-
tached to either the executive or legislative branch. To the extent
that it is enmeshed with politics or another branch of government
its role in the proper resolution of disputes is tainted. The present
process is so enmeshed, and even when it is not, it creates an
impression of entanglement. The line between appearance and
reality in the eyes of the public is often indistinct. For this
reason alone the appointive system now employed contains unde-
sirable features that undermine esteem for legal institutions and
processes.
Some have said that, regardless of appearances, the President
should have the same unqualified powers of appointment with
regard to federal judges as he does for cabinet officers. But the
differences between the two types of posts are extensive. For
the sake of efficiency alone the President should be allowed to
choose those who will work with him. His nominations to posts
in the executive department are not given life tenure, nor are
they to be independent of him. Members of the judiciary, on the
other hand, are independent. They are not 'his" people. They are
not to work for him or with him. The judiciary is a separate
branch by law; its members do not serve at the executive's
discretion nor can they consult him in their decision-making.9
These characteristics make it clear that the President's discretion
7See Scott, The Selection oJf Federal Judges, 24 WASE. & Lan L. Rv. 205,
206 (1967). A table compiledby the ABA reveals, for instance, that 98.7% of
President Wilson's nominees were Democratic, 97% of President F. D. Roosevelt's
nominees were Democratic, 95% of President Eisenhower's nominees were Re-
publican. The lowest percentages of party nominees were those of President Taft-
82%, and President Kennedy-88.9%. The ABA committee report kept such figures
until 1969 when it determined, sua sponte, that party affiliation was not a relevant
criterion. ABA STAND. COM. ON THE FEDEmAL JUDIcIARY, REPORT 489 (1956).
8 See Scott, supra note 7, at 206.
9 See Black, A Note on Senatorial Considerations of Supreme Court Nominees,
79 YALE L.J. 657, 660 (1970). See also Tnu FEDERALiST No. 76 AN 77, supra
note 6.
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or pleasure should not be the primary criterion for judicial
nominations.
Others concede the uniqueness of judicial selection processes
but contend that the President has the right to inject his par-
ticular judicial philosophy into the judiciary through his nomina-
tions. Unfortunately, a corollary of this view is that only those
who agree with the President are qualified. Thus a potential
judge clearly superior to another nominee might be excluded be-
cause his interpretations are not as "close" to the President's.
Allowed to go unchecked, this could result in a portion of the
bench being beneath its potential in quality.10
If it can be assumed that the choice of one man for President
includes a choice of his particular judicial philosophy (and this is
disputed), it still need not be unqualified. There is a point beyond
which that choice should no longer be acceded to. That point
is reflected in the nation's greater concern for the best possible
judiciary. Anything less reduces the public's esteem and confi-
dence." In short, the President's desire to have a particular
viewpoint reflected on the bench should be limited when, as a
consequence, quality is compromised.' 2
Closely related to this is the emphasis upon having ethnic,
racial, religious and sexual groups represented. Likewise, certain
regions or sections of the bar desire to be represented. Again,
to the extent that these desires do not conflict with maintaining
the highest quality bench, they should be respected. There is
some question as to whether the present mechanism honors such
a balance.
Article II grants the President the power to nominate federal
judges, but is that power actually employed by him, or does he
more often than not consent to the choices made by state or local
politicians or by the Justice Department? No one would argue
that judgeships should be dispensed as favors; yet, reliance on
1o See Black, supra note 9.
11 Indeed this seems to be the root of the latest controversy over Supreme
Court nominations. President Nixon asserted an absolute right to have a 'strict
constructionist" on the court while "concerned' liberals sought to protect the
existing character of the court from erosion.
' 2 See Black, supra note 9. The relation between judicial philosophy and party
affiliation is also worth noting. It is possible that the executive could shadow
actual political pa~ motives behind the broad tag of "judicial philosophy." The
merger of party af'ation and judicial philosophy is often evident; however, it is
unlikely that it is present 90 percent of the timel
1972]
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political machinery usually results in that very thing. Accepting
a senator's choice without any independent search creates prob-
lems. 13 Followed blindly, it represents an abdication of presi-
dential powers to backroom dealings. As a matter of policy, the
judiciary must be removed from the possibility of such occur-
rences.
As much as possible, the President's nominations (including
the complete process leading up to them) should be open and
known to everyone. Currently the real process is often covert
and beyond the reach of the public.'4
The agency which has the largest role in federal judicial
nominations is the Justice Department." As the chief litigant in
the federal courts, the Justice Department's prominent part in
judicial selections is, to say the least, undesirable. The conflict
of interest that can and does arise as a result of the Attorney
General's functions necessarily reflects on the character of the
bench. One criterion of qualification should not be whether the
candidate pleases or is favorable to a primary litigant. The
President's use of the Justice Department unfortunately creates
such an anomaly, but under the present system there is no
alternative.
In 1946 the criticisms voiced above led to the formation of a
special committee in the American Bar Association. It evolved
into what is now the A.B.A.'s Standing Committee on the
Federal Judiciary. In recent years, this committee has played
13 See Chase, supra note 4, at 221. See also the discussion of the controversy
over the nomination of Francis Morrissey by President Johnson in 1965, described
by Professor Chase in judicial Appointments-1968-1966, 52 MIN. L. R;v. 965,
980-86 (1968).
14 The Senate hearings are open but the procedures to that point are exces-
sively secretive. See Chase, supra note 4.
15 See Scott, supra note 7, at 207. Miller, Federal Judicial Appointments: The
Continuing Struggle for Good Judges, 41 A.B.A.J. 125, 128 (1955). Senator Scott
has said:
What of the role played by the Department of Justice in the selection of
judges? It is conceivable that the public may feel that factors extraneous
to the legal merits may influence the decision of a judge when the
Justice Department is a party to the suit and the Department plays such
an important role in the changes of the presiding judge's promotion.
Whatever the objective merits as to whether such factors influence to any
extent-the result of the case, the necessary public confidence in the
judiciary should not be undermined by a suspicion, no matter how
unfounded, that the cards are stacked against them.
Scott, The Selection of Federal Judges: The Independent Commission Approach,
8 WM. & MARY L. REV. 173, 180 (1967).
[Vol. 60
ME=T SELECriON OF FEDEA JUDGES
an important role in the selection of federal judges.16 The nominal
function of this body is to protect the integrity of the federal
bench by evaluating nominees for judicial vacancies.
The degree to which the A.B.A. committee participates in
judicial selection depends entirely on the indulgence of the
Senate and the President. The authority it exerts is a function
of the esteem accorded its recommendations and findings. Fur-
thermore, it serves primarily in a post facto capacity. That is, it
does not attempt to seek out talented persons for the bench and
bring them to the attention of the President. Instead, it limits
itself to evaluating the candidates put forward by the Justice
Department. Nonetheless, the A.B.A. committee does represent
a healthy check upon the potential inroads on the competence
of the federal bench.
The Senate was intended to be the foremost check on the
character of the President's selections. However, it is itself a
part of the political process. Its members are not divorced from
the pressures attached to the advantages of securing a judicial
post.
The present federal judicial selection mechanism can best be
characterized as overly political. It is far from the anticipations
of the Constitution. It is highly enmeshed in the politics of the
executive and legislative branches. It is not conducive to im-
partiality or separation of governmental powers. More im-
portantly, it does not assure the quality of justice each citizen
has a right to expect. The majority of federal judges today are
quite competent, but that does not suggest that we have the
best bench or that future selections will be as good.
SoMm ALTERNATIVE SELECTION METHODS
Not being complacent about the quality of those chosen to
the federal judiciary is not enough. If we are concerned that the
quality of the judges who administer the Constitution and federal
laws not be diminished, it is incumbent upon us to delineate a
16 The history of the ABA committee as described in Grossman, The Role of
the ABA in the Selection of Federal Judges: Episodic Involvement to Institu-
tionalize Power, 17 VAND. L. REv. 785 (1964). See Chase, supra note 4. See also
Goldman, judicial Appointment to the U.S. Court of Appeals, 1967 Wis. L. REv.
186 (1967); Segal, Federal Judicial Selection-Progress and the Promise of the
Future, 46 MAss. L.Q. 138 (1961).
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better selection process. It is suggested that the method employed
by many states, most often referred to as the merit plan,'17 is such
a process.
The merit selection method involves the use of a publicly
visible panel that recruits, evaluates and recommends a list of
qualified candidates for use by the executive in making his
nomination. Ideally, it is empowered by statute or constitution
and functions as a non-partisan, continuing, advisory body com-
posed of members of the bar, the bench and the citizenry. In a
number of states, however, governors have found it to their
advantage to set up such a commission on their own initiative."
Its explicit purpose is to insure careful consideration so that each
vacancy is filled by the best possible candidate. Thus it reassures
the public that the judiciary is being selected on the basis of
excellence and competence rather than party service or other
irrelevant considerations. At the state level it has proven to be
a method of making good appointments without transgressing
on valid executive prerogatives. In short, merit selection com-
missions reduce suspicious appearances, secure the foremost candi-
dates, engender public confidence and retain executive authority."9
In 1966 Senator Hugh Scott introduced a bill in the U.S.
Senate which proposed the establishment of a panel to advise the
President on judicial appointments.2 0 According to Senator Scott:
My bill would establish a seven-man Judicial Service
Commission to be appointed by the President by and with the
advice and consent of the Senate. At least three members
would be present or former members of the American Bar
Association's Committee on the Federal Judiciary, and at least
two would be retired federal judges. No more than four
members would come from the same political party. The
Commission would examine the qualifications of prospective
appointees to the federal bench and, whenever a vacancy
occurred, would make recommendations to the President for
the filling of such vacancy. My bill expresses the sense of Con-
'7 Winters, The Merit Plan for Judicial Selection and Tenure-Its Historical
Development, 7 DUQUESNE L. 1Rv. 61 (1968). See also note 4, supra.
18 See Lowe, Voluntary Merit Selection Plans, 55 JuDicA'unE 161 (1971).
19 See SELECTED READINcS: JUDICIAL SELECTION AND TENuRE (G. Winters ed.
1968).
20 S. 3579, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966). See Scott, Legislative Proposals for
Reform of the Federal Judiciary, 50 JUDICATU E 50 (1966).
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gress that, whenever the President appoints an individual to
the federal judiciary who was not recommended by the Com-
mission, he shall furnish the Senate with a statement explain-
ing why he did not follow the Commission's advice.
21
The bill was premised upon the principle of the merit plan.
Unfortunately, the bill never got out of the judiciary committee
and has not been proposed again.22
The foremost criticism of the idea embodied in Senator Scott's
bill is that the A.B.A. committee already functions in much the
same manner. This is simply not so. A legally recognized, con-
tinuing body would be much different in form, function and
authority.
As was noted earlier, the viability of the A.B.A. committee is
directly proportional to the regard its views are given. If the
Senate or President solicits and relies on its views, it has some
weight. But the stir created after the committee's unfavorable
recommendations on President Nixon's recent choices for the
Supreme Court reveals how tenuous its influence is. Furthermore,
inspection of past reports by the committee shows that finding
a nominee "unqualified" may have no effect on the ultimate
choice made by the President. -3 The respect accorded a legally
authorized body, on the other hand, would be much greater. As
an authorized body, its recommendations would constitute in
themselves a source of pressure. Because it would not be very
convenient or simple to discard a commission's report, they would
be important.
21 Scott, supra note 20, at 53.
22 Senator Scott's proposal is by no means the only proposal for reform of the
federal process. For instance, after the decision in Brown v. Board of Education
no fewer than 14 proposals that would have altered the process were introduced in
the 85th Congress. See H.R. Res. 408, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957). In 1958 the
ABA presented a resolution to the President which urged:
Suggestions for nominations should originate in an independent Com-
mission established as an agency of the President, to advise with the
President on Appointments, and to receive from outside sources and
from all segments of the organized Bar, suggestions of names of persons
deemed highly qualified for appointment as judges in their respective
jurisdictions.
See 44 A.B.A.J. 1109-12. For reaction (most favorable) to the resolution see 42
JUDICATrE 91 (1958).
23 Chase, supra note 13; Goldman, supra note 16. Up to February 1, 1972,
President Nixon had not nominated a person who was not found qualified by the
ABA committee. While each of his 164 nominees was qualified this was not the
case under earlier Presidents. President Johnson, President Kennedy and President
Eisenhower each nominated persons found "not qualified' in approximately 6%
of their selections.
19721
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Another point of difference is that the A.B.A. committee only
attempts to "exclude". It is negatively oriented in that it is
designed to keep out unqualified judges.24 Because it works in an
after-the-fact manner (i.e. having no ability to seek out qualified
nominees), the A.B.A. committee cannot be positively oriented.
The true goal, however, should be to attain quality in a direct
manner. Judge Samuel Rosemnan emphasized this concept several
years ago in a speech to the American Judicature Society when he
said:
Most of the agitation to change methods of selection comes
from a desire to keep out [an unqualified] judge.
But it is not enough for a system of judicial selection to
aim at exclusions. It should not be designed negatively as a
'keep out' system. It should be affirmative and positive-pro-
viding a means of bringing to the bench, not haphazardly or
occasionally but as consistently and routinely as possible, the
very best talent available and willing to serve.25
A merit selection process authorized by Congress would be
positive. A continually serving body with built-up expertise and
a willingness and ability to search out the very best talent would
not have to be concerned negatively. The difference in attitude
alone is tremendously significant and is reason enough to seek
a reform of the present system.
As the A.B.A. committee is presently composed, the public
exercises no power over its composition. While its members are
among the most prestigious and esteemed lawyers in the country,
there is no assurance that they are the best persons to undertake
such a role. Although its members presently represent a broad
cross section of the country this may not always be the case. 26
Too, is it necessarily true that only the bar can judge? Is it
possible that only certain sections of the bar are represented? It
is likely that a committee appointed by the President might be
less representative or less professionally knowledgeable than the
A.B.A. committee; but at least representatives of the public would
have some part in the process.
24 Grossman, supra note 16, at 809.
25 Rosenman, A Better Way to Select Judges, 48 JUDicATURE 86-87 (1964).
26 However, committee selection procedures do seem to attempt to preserve a
cross-sectional grouping. At the same time, they are not assured of doing so.
[Vol. 60
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Closely related to this last point is the unacknowledged status
of the A.B.A. committee. The position of a statutorily empowered
selection commission would be legitimized. A public forum
acknowledged by law to advise the Senate and the President
would create much more awareness and sensitivity. Many people
are not aware that the A.B.A. committee serves in an advisory
capacity with respect to appointments to all lifetime federal
judicial posts other than the Supreme Court. For instance, since
his inauguration President Nixon has nominated 164 persons to
vacancies in various District Courts, Courts of Appeal, the Court
of Claims, Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and the U.S.
Customs Court.17 On all but one of these the A.B.A. committee
first reported to the Justice Department on the qualifications of
the nominee before submission to the Senate. This function is
important and it should be recognized and made known.
28
It is argued that the use of a nominating commission whose
members are appointed by the President would only serve to
shift the area of politics to that sphere. It is to be noted that the
commission is formulated on a non-partisan basis. While it would
be unrealistic to expect everyone involved to put politics com-
pletely out of mind, if the membership is balanced politically
opposing forces would be neutralized so that criteria other than
politics would become the foremost issues. Furthermore, the
system could be set up as in most state systems so that vacancies
on the commission could not all occur at the same time. Other
safeguards could be formulated to protect against the commis-
sion's becoming another political arena. Thus, the argument that
a commission would change nothing could be silenced by safe-
guards that could be provided against politicizing it.
CONCLUSION
Two material factors lend special impetus to the need for law
reform in general and reform of the federal judiciary in particular.
The increasingly complex nature of our society with its conse-
27 ABA STAND. Comm. ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIAY, REPORT 4-5 (1972).28 This suggests another alternative. Have a statutory authorization of the
ABA committee. Some fear that the bar group might be afraid to criticize those
whom they practice before, but, to date, this has not proved to be a valid
assumption. Recognition of the ABA along with a grant of more positive powers
might be a sound compromise.
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quent "law explosion" 9 and the heightened sensitivity to judicial
conduct 0 should be cause enough to take a second glance at our
judiciary and the manner in which it is chosen. Senator Scott
spoke on this point quite eloquently when he said:
... with the need for qualified judges in the Federal courts
greater today than ever before due to the increasing number,
diversity, and complexity of cases, we... must be the leaders
in answering the challenge to ensure that the most competent
and qualified men available-and recognized as such by the
public-serve in the Federal judiciary.31
Instituting merit selection procedures would alleviate many
of the more serious criticisms of the federal nominating process,
but such procedures are no panacea. One noted authority went
to the crux of the matter quite succinctly by noting:
No judge was ever great because he was selected in a certain
manner, but the manner of his selection may cause him to be
less great than he could have been had he been free of the
limitations imposed upon him by the circumstances of his
selection .... It is certainly fair to ask, as to any method of
selection that already exists or is proposed: Will it achieve, or
at least will it move in the direction of achieving, the designa-
tion of judges solely from among those of our number who
will really make good judges?32
What is the aim of any selection process? What should be the
standards and how should they be applied? Perhaps the words
of a past president of the American Judicature Society and the
American Bar Association, Chief Justice Arthur T. Vanderbilt of
New Jersey give some indication:
[An] essential of a sound judicial system is, of course, a corps
of judges, each of them utterly independent and beholden
only to the law and to the Constitution, thoroughly grounded
29 See CouiRT CONGESTION AND DELAY: SELECTED READINGS (G. Winters ed.
1971).
30 This is evidenced by the extensive debate over President Nixon's recent
Supreme Court nominations, accusations against leading federal judges and the
action of the Judicial Conference in setting rigid standards of conduct for federal
judges.
31 Scott, supra note 7, at 176.32 Leflar, supra note 4, at 300-01.
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in his knowledge of the law and of human nature including
its political manifestations, experience at the bar in either
trial or appellate work and preferably in both, of such a tem-
perament that he can hear both sides of a case before making
up his mind, devoted to the law and justice, industrious, and,
above all, honest and believed to be honest.
33
Incorporating his standards into the guidelines currently em-
ployed by the A.B.A. committee on the Federal Judiciary
34
would do much to increase the standing of the federal bench in
the mind's eye of the public-if those standards were employed
under the imprimatur of Congress by a body of respected citizens.
Such a mechanism would make known to the President in a timely
and impartial manner those persons who were exceptionally
qualified for the federal bench. It would have several advantages:
it would insure that the choice was not made by the chief litigant
of the federal courts; it would limit the role of politics; it would
create an atmosphere of impartiality and expertise; it would be
able to function in a positive manner to seek out qualified men
and women; it would mean few judges would need to remove
public suspicions about their partisanship or abilities.
Mr. Justice Miller ninety years ago made a point that is par-
ticularly applicable here. In one case he posited:
[The] power and influence [of judges] rest solely upon the
public sense of the necessity for the existence of a tribunal to
which all may appeal for the assertion and protection of rights
33 Vanderbilt, The Essentials of a Sound Judicial System, 48 Nw. U.L. RE.v.
], 3 (1953).
34 The statement of standards applied according to the most recent committee
reads:
For its part, the Committee has determined to apply very high standards.
After its report on Judge Harrold Carswell in 1970, the Committee re-
evaluated its function. It concluded that mere absence of specific fault
was not enough to justify its lack of opposition to a Supreme Court
nomination-that excellence was required as measured against a national
standard rather than a local standard. As to sitting judges, it decided that
more than pedestrian judicial experience was required. In the absence of
judicial experience, the Committee concluded that only a record of
exceptional professional accomplishment and national prominence in the
legal profession could justify an appointment to the Supreme Court. It
was the view of the Committee that a community reputation for excellence
was not enough and that a broader national standard should be ap-
plied. Particularly in the absence of significant judicial experience, this
would require experience of sufficient public or professional importance
to expose its incumbent to national professional scrutiny.
ABA STAND. Com. ON THE FEEEAL JuDIcIAlY, REPORT 3 (1972).
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guaranteed by the Constitution and by the laws of the land,
and on the confidence reposed in the soundness of their de-
cisions and the purity of their motives.35
It is suggested that the use of a federal judicial nominating
commission to advise the President would increase the confidence
of the people. It would go far to insure the purity of the bench's
motives and (because of the probable increase in quality) the
soundness of their decisions.
No reason other than the protection of the political benefits
now enjoyed exists for retaining the present federal selection
process. We can not afford to postpone action any longer. This
one small but significant reform would do much to bolster
confidence in our institutions of law and the men who administer
them.
35 United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 223 (1882) (emphasis added).
